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Ethics reform for government institutions in the 
United States has followed an uneven path since 
modern reform efforts began in earnest in the 1970s 
in the wake of Watergate. Ethics reform is arguably a 
“reactive” and “piecemeal process” that has been 
“undertaken defensively.”1 In the traditional cycle, 
ethics reform rises on the public’s agenda after 
scandals have been uncovered2; public officials then 
become concerned about the reputation of their 
institutions and their own electoral prospect.3 Then, 
in response, regulations are crafted to prevent a 
reoccurrence of behaviors.4 Once an ethical problem 
is addressed through a regulatory “fix,” ethics reform 
becomes less salient to the public.   
 
Ethics reform, however, is not solely about designing 
rules to curb isolated incidents of undesirable 
behavior by public officials. Ethics reform in 
legislatures at both the federal and state levels reveals 
important beliefs about how the American system of 
government operates.5 Legislative ethics involves 
conflicting views about the nature of representation6 
as well as different perspectives on the 
responsibilities of office-holders to citizens and the 
government institutions in which they serve.7      
                                                          
Dr. Rebekkah Stuteville is Vice Provost and an Associate 
Professor of Public Administration at Park University, 
Parkville, Missouri. 
1 Bruce Jennings, “The Institutionalization of Ethics in the U.S. 
Senate,” The Hastings Center Report 11, no. 1 (Feb. 1981): 6, 
accessed December 11, 2016, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/3561596. 
2 Beth A. Rosenson, “The Impact of Ethics Laws on Legislative 
Recruitment and the Occupational Composition of State 
Legislatures,” Political Research Quarterly 59, no. 4 (Dec. 
2006): 619, accessed December 11, 2016, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4148064; Alan Rosenthal, Drawing 
the Line: Legislative Ethics in the States (Lincoln, NE: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1996), 7. 
3 Dennis F. Thompson, “The Ethics of Representation,” The 
Hastings Center Report 11, no. 1 (Feb. 1981): 10, accessed 
This paper examines views on representation and 
their effect on ethics reform through a decidedly 
Missouri lens in the areas of conflicts of interest, 
lobbying, and campaign finance. First, the paper 
looks at ethics reform in the context of the role of the 
state legislator’s or congressional member’s duties as 
a representative of his or her constituents and in 
relationship to common standards of ethics. Second, 
the paper explores Congressman Richard Bolling’s 
perspective on ethics reform. Bolling represented the 
state of Missouri in the U.S. House of Representatives 
for over three decades and he was a well-known 
advocate of congressional reform, including ethics 
reform. Finally, the paper examines the ethics reform 
that appears to be emerging in the state of Missouri.  
 
 
Ethics Reform, Representation, and Standards 
 
Efforts to change campaign finance laws, control the 
revolving door between the public and private sectors, 
and reduce conflicts of interest are not exclusively 
about controlling discrete instances of self-interested 
behavior by legislators at the federal and state levels. 
Legislative ethics is connected to beliefs about how 
elected officials serve as representatives and their 
responsibilities as representatives.8 For example, 
when looking at some of the complexities of 
representation and ethics in the area of conflicts of 
interest, Charlene Wear Simmons argues that the 
“unclear, contradictory meanings of representation 
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create practical obstacles to resolving legislative 
conflict of interest problems.”9 Simmons explains 
that legislative conflicts of interest can be viewed 
from the perspective of two traditional models of 
representation—the delegate and trustee.10 Both 
models entail legitimate functions of representation, 
but they place different emphasis on the way in which 
the public interest is realized in the policy process, 
which has implications for ethics. The delegate model 
is grounded in shared interests, while the trustee 
model relies on independent judgement.  
 
In the delegate model the elected official ably serves 
her constituents because she shares their 
“backgrounds and interests.”11 For example, in the 
delegate model it is desirable for a legislator from a 
ranching community to represent livestock interests, 
and her ability to do so is enhanced by her occupation 
as a rancher. As Dennis F. Thompson explains, when 
serving as a delegate “a legislator cannot adequately 
represent the interests of constituents without also 
representing some of his or her own.”12 In this model 
particular interests are translated into the more 
general public good by delegates assuming the role of 
“broker.”13 Thus representation involves sharing and 
advocating for the interests of constituents since a 
“clash of interest against interest” will arguably 
promote the public interest or at least keep one group 
from dominating the policy process.14  
 
The delegate and broker roles, however, are often 
viewed with skepticism. The criticisms are rooted in 
suspicion of human nature as well as the feasibility of 
all interests being represented in policymaking. The 
fear about human nature is that a delegate’s “personal 
interest will supersede the public interest when the 
two become intertwined.”15 For example, whose 
interest is the rancher legislator representing when 
legislation is proposed that may affect the pool of 
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labor available to ranchers? Her own interests, her 
rancher constituents, or the workers?  
 
Critics would argue that the temptation is that she will 
represent her own interests which are aligned with her 
rancher constituents, but she may not be the best 
advocate for the state or country or workers. A related 
criticism is that the mechanism for achieving the 
public interest does not function in the manner 
suggested since not all interests are represented and 
heard in a system of “delegates” and “brokers.” The 
more powerful and wealthy interests prevail in a 
system based on influence. As E.E. Schattschneider 
famously remarked “the flaw in the pluralist heaven 
is that the heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper-
class accent.”16     
 
The traditional alternative to the delegate is the trustee 
model. The trustee is a representative who 
demonstrates independent judgement and is 
unbiased.17 The elected official relies on her 
judgement rather than that of her constituents’ to do 
what she believes is in the best interest of her 
constituents, the state, or the nation as a whole. The 
trustee embraces state or national interests rather than 
interests of specific groups, and ideally she acts as 
statesperson.  
 
The trustee model, however, cannot be disassociated 
from concerns about human nature either. Critics of 
the trustee model cite the middle-class professional 
bias of trustees who may substitute their middle-class 
judgement for that of those they represent, and leave 
the interests of a large segment of the population 
without a voice.18 Thus the trustee model does not 
control for human nature nor does it resolve the 
problem of unequal influence by groups with more 
resources.19 For practical purposes, members of 
Congress and state legislatures may not be strict 
15 Simmons, “Thoughts on Legislative Ethics Reform and 
Representation,” 195. 
16 E.E. Schattschneider, The Semisovereign People: A Realist’s 
View of Democracy in America (Ft. Worth: Harcourt Brace 
Jovanovich College Publishers, 1960): 34-35.   
17 Simmons, “Thoughts on Legislative Ethics Reform and 
Representation,” 195. 
18 Ibid, 195-196. 
19 Simmons argues that neither the trustee nor delegate role 
“avoids the conflict of interest problems associated with self-
interest” (Simmons, “Thoughts on Legislative Ethics Reform 
and Representation,” 196). 
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adherents to only one model. They may be a trustee 
on one issue, but a delegate on another.  
 
Additionally, Thompson argues that the trustee-
delegate dichotomy is not especially useful for 
developing ethical standards or principles.20 There is, 
however, value in the dichotomy insomuch as it 
moves the discussion of ethics reform beyond a 
narrow concern regarding conflicts of interest to the 
moral obligations of elected representatives to 
promote justice and seek a “just representation of 
interests.”21 Representation is not only about the 
“one-to-one relation between constituents and 
legislators, but a collective process involving 
systematic interactions among many people holding 
different roles,”22 which may include legislators, 
special interests, and citizens.  
 
In addition to using traditional constructs of 
representation such as the delegate and trustee, other 
standards can be employed to analyze legislative 
ethics. Alan Rosenthal explores traditional standards 
for examining political ethics and proposes some of 
his own standards in his book Drawing the Line: 
Legislative Ethics in the States. First, Rosenthal 
explains that the notions of autonomy and publicity 
are often standards employed by ethicists.23 
Autonomy calls for legislators to act independently 
and make judgements that are “‘informed, unbiased, 
and uncoerced.’”24 Similarly, publicity is a commonly 
embraced standard since legislators are supposed to 
be accountable to the citizens who elect them and 
whom they serve.25  
 
Rosenthal, however, argues that both autonomy and 
publicity suffer from being difficult to 
operationalize.26 Autonomy rests on defining 
“improper” influence, which is a slippery slope in 
politics, and publicity may inhibit the type of 
compromise required by democracy.27 Rosenthal, 
instead, argues that appearance, fairness (primarily to 
the legislators), and responsibility (for the 
                                                          
20 Thompson, The Ethics of Representation, 12.  
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22 Ibid, 13. 
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24 Rosenthal, Drawing the Line, 64 quoting the Hastings 
Center. 
25 Rosenthal, Drawing the Line, 65.  
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maintenance and functioning of legislative 
institutions) are the standards that should be used.28  
All of the standards discussed by Rosenthal are 
evident in the writings of Congressman Richard 
Bolling. These standards as well as the trustee and 
delegate models will be used to examine Bolling’s 
approach to legislative ethics.  
 
 
Missouri Congressman Richard Bolling  
 
Congressman Richard Bolling served Missouri in the 
U.S. House of Representatives for decades, and was 
an ardent reformer. His philosophy about ethics 
reform and representation often aligns more closely 
with the trustee model, but elements of the delegate 
model are evident as well. His tendency toward the 
trustee model is noticeable in his 1965 book House 
Out of Order in which he quotes Edmund Burke’s 
1774 speech in which Burke claims that a 
“representative owes you not his industry only, but 
his judgment; and he betrays, instead of serving you, 
if he sacrifices it to your opinion.”29  
 
On one hand Bolling’s trustee leanings may reflect 
the national stage he operated on, but, on the other 
hand, it may indicate a pattern of preference for 
independent judgement. The ethical standards 
outlined by Rosenthal30 also run throughout Bolling’s 
writings, but emphasis is placed on the standard of 
autonomy which is compatible with the trustee role.  
 
Bolling’s ideas about reform had theoretical 
underpinnings, but he crafted a pragmatic approach to 
representation and ethics which was guided by his 
experience as “lieutenant and legman” to powerful 
House of Representatives Speaker Sam Rayburn.31 
His notions about reform were further sharpened with 
time in Congress, particularly with his experience 
serving as chairman of the influential House Rules 
Committee. Bolling’s ideas represent an interesting 
combination of both political theory and practical 
27 Ibid, 64-66. 
28 Ibid, 66-72.  
29 Richard Bolling, House Out of Order (New York, Dutton & 
Co, Inc., 1964): 46, quoting Edmund Burke (1774). 
30 Rosenthal, Drawing the Line. 
31 Richard Bolling, House Out of Order (New York, Dutton & 
Co, Inc., 1964): 12.  




Bolling began his career in the U.S. House 
representing Missouri’s 5th District in 1949. After 16 
years in Congress, Bolling wrote House Out of Order 
in which he proclaimed: 
 
“. . . the House has revealed itself to me as 
ineffective in its role as a coordinate branch of 
the federal government, negative in its approach 
to national tasks, generally unresponsive to any 
but parochial economic interests. Its procedures, 
time-consuming and unwieldy, mask anonymous 
centers of irresponsible power. Its legislation is 
often a travesty of what the national welfare 
requires.”32  
 
In House Out of Order Bolling set about outlining a 
three-pronged approach for remedying the problems 
of the House through: 1) Redrawing the boundaries of 
Congressional districts, 2) Implementing reforms that 
affect individual members by eliminating conflicts of 
interest, disclosing financial holdings, limiting 
influence on executive and regulatory bodies, and 
campaign finance, and 3) Reforming the procedures 
in Congress.33  
 
House Out of Order explains the foundation of 
Bolling’s position on conflicts of interest, lobbying, 
and campaign finance reform, all of which articulate 
some concern about the role of representatives who 
may not see beyond self-interest or be able to untangle 
themselves from powerful moneyed interests 
financing their campaigns. The book also previews 
Bolling’s plans for committee reform which is a 
window into his views on representation as well as 
early concerns about deteriorating party discipline in 
the House of Representatives. 
 
 
                                                          
32 Ibid, 221. 
33 Ibid, 222. 
34 Rosenthal, Drawing the Line, 64 quoting the Hastings 
Center. The Hastings Center describes “autonomous agents” as 
those who make decisions based on “unbiased” judgment. 
35 Rosenthal, Drawing the Line, 64-72. 
36 Bolling, House Out of Order, 224.  
37 See Rothenthal’s discussion of fairness as it applies to how 
legislators are treated (Rosenthal, Drawing the Line, 70-71).   
38 Bolling, House Out of Order, 227. 
Conflict of Interests 
 
Bolling’s position on conflicts of interest reveals an 
underlying concern about the ability of members of 
Congress to regulate their own behavior when self-
interest is involved. It also illustrates his preference 
for creating independent bodies to monitor behavior, 
and an emphasis on transparency as a tool. The 
standards of fairness, publicity, and “unbiased” 
judgement34 are all evident in Bolling’s approach to 
conflicts of interest.35 
 
For Bolling the two central questions related to 
conflicts of interest are: 1) “What kinds of outside 
employment and income are compatible with what 
kinds of committee assignments?” and, 2) “How far 
should a Member go in voting on matters in which he 
has some personal stake?”36 On the subject of outside 
employment, Bolling’s solution was a practical one 
that emphasized fairness to his colleagues.37 Bolling 
proposed mitigating the influence of outside 
employment on congressmen by reducing their need 
for outside income. He acknowledged the inadequacy 
of the $22,500 salary for members in 1964 for 
meeting the demands of family and their jobs.38 He 
suggested increasing salaries, travel allowances, and 
pensions to ensure that their service in Congress is a 
full-time job.39 Bolling also recommended that 
members of Congress should be required to file a 
publicly available report of their income, gifts, assets, 
contributions, real estate, securities, and relatives 
employed by the federal government.40  
 
In answer to the question on conflicts of interest in 
voting, Bolling believed in adherence to the 
“Jefferson Rule” which was in effect in the House 
until the 1870s.41 The “Jefferson Rule . . . requires that 
if ‘the private interests of a member are concerned in 
a bill or question, he is to withdraw’—that is, step 
aside and not vote.”42 He preferred the “Jefferson 
39 Ibid, 229. For a discussion of citizen legislatures versus 
career politicians see Rosenthal, Drawing the Line, 78-80. 
40 Bolling, House Out of Order, 229.  
41 Unidentified Manuscript in “Playboy Article Regarding 
House Reform” folder, LaBudde Special Collections, Richard 
W. Bolling Collection, University of Missouri—Kansas City, 
Box 367, folder 25. See also Bolling, House Out of Order, 224.   
42 Unidentified Manuscript in “Playboy Article Regarding 
House Reform” folder, LaBudde Special Collections, Richard 
W. Bolling Collection, University of Missouri—Kansas City, 
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Rule” over the more lenient practice instituted in the 
House of Representatives in 1874 which allowed a 
member of the House to “vote his private interests if 
the measure is not for his exclusive benefit.”43 Bolling 
questioned, “Where is the Member to draw the line? 
Or should it be drawn for him? And, if so, by 
whom?”44 Bolling advocated for a reasonable, but 
relatively bright line for members of Congress which 
does not allow members to “be a judge in [their] own 
cause.”45 To help remedy conflicts of interest Bolling 
supported a commission on legislative ethics with at 
least half of the members from outside Congress 
which would study conflicts of interest and issue 
public reports.46 Again, Bolling saw wisdom in 
monitoring by external parties and scrutiny by the 





Bolling’s writings on lobbying demonstrate an 
appreciation for the role of interest groups, but 
through a practical lens. Bolling considered lobbying 
“an indispensable adjunct of the legislative 
process.”47 He respected the functions that lobbyists 
play by providing information to members of 
Congress and the rights of lobbyists under the First 
Amendment.48 However, he also recognized the 
influence that lobbies have in providing campaign 
support to candidates who favored their agendas, and 
in getting “friendly” candidates on key committees.49 
Bolling believed that “It is the gray area in the 
lobbying picture that must be clarified.”50  
Bolling pressed for transparency and regulation of 
lobbying activities,51 and, once again favored the 
                                                          
Box 367, folder 25: 2b-2c. See also Bolling, House Out of 
Order, 224.   
43 Bolling, House Out of Order, 224.   
44 Ibid, 225.   
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47 Ibid, 131.  
48 Bolling Press Release, October 8, 1970, LaBudde Special 
Collections, Richard W. Bolling Collection, University of 
Missouri—Kansas City, Box 83, folder 13; Bolling, House Out 
of Order, 133. 
49 Bolling, House Out of Order, 138-140.  
50 Bolling Press Release, October 8, 1970, LaBudde Special 
Collections, Richard W. Bolling Collection, University of 
Missouri—Kansas City, Box 83, folder 13 
51 Ibid. 
52 Rosenthal, Drawing the Line, 65-66. 
standard of publicity.52 In testimony before the 
Standards of Official Conduct, Bolling stated that “As 
one who has long advocated opening up the business 
of the Congress to the public, it is my firm belief that 
efforts to influence legislation are an important part 
of that business of which the public has the right to 
know.”53 In the early 1970s, Bolling called for 
lobbyists to file reports with the attorney general and 
provide more detailed reports of expenditures and 
contributions. He also wanted the attorney general to 
review the reports and recommend action for 
inaccurate reports and failures to file, with the 
information being publicly available.54    
 
Later in 1977 Bolling served as floor manager when 
the House of Representatives adopted a code of ethics 
which regulated, among other things, gifts from 
lobbyists.55 The measure prohibited gifts over $100 
from lobbyists and required disclosure of virtually all 
gifts, regardless of the source.56 As argued by 
Rosenthal, such limits are in line with the ethical 
standards of appearance and responsibility.57  
 
Bolling’s opinion on lobbyists reflected another 
aspect of his thinking on representation—his desire 
for a system in which all voices in the policy process 
are politically informed, active, and represented.58 
Bolling conceded that the “lobbies are as diverse as 
our society”59 but also lamented that the leaders of the 
lobbies may be out of touch with their membership 
and become interested in “self-perpetuation”60 rather 
than representation. Additionally, he expressed 
concern for the “regular constituents” who were more 
“acted upon than acting,” but who could play an 
important role in the democratic process by becoming 
53 Bolling Testimony Before Standards of Official Conduct 
(Reading Copy), March 16, 1971, 3, LaBudde Special 
Collections, Richard W. Bolling Collection, University of 
Missouri—Kansas City, Box 83, folder 13. 
54 Bolling Press Release, October 8, 1970, LaBudde Special 
Collections, Richard W. Bolling Collection, University of 
Missouri—Kansas City, Box 83, folder 13. 
55 Independence Examiner Article, “Here’s What New House 
Code of Ethics Provides,” March 4, 1977. LaBudde Special 
Collections, Richard W. Bolling Collection, University of 
Missouri—Kansas City, Box 205, folder 7. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Rosenthal, Drawing the Line, 137. 
58 Bolling, House Out of Order, 142-143. 
59 Ibid, 133.  
60 Ibid, 143. 
6 | Missouri Policy Journal | Number 5 (Summer/Fall 2017) 
 
more informed and involved.61 Bolling saw the 
informed individual voter as part of the solution to the 
powerful lobbyists, but citizens would have to be 
more informed, willing to make small contributions 
to their national parties, and more engaged in 
politics.62   
 
 
Campaign Finance Reform 
 
Bolling’s position on the influence of money in the 
legislative process was consistent with his position on 
the influence of money in the electoral process. 
Freeing legislators from the perceived obligations of 
lobbyists and large donations could potentially make 
legislators more autonomous and enable them to 
make “‘unbiased, and uncoerced judgments.’”63 In 
1973, Bolling proclaimed that “I know of nothing 
more important than getting control of the whole 
problem of money in politics.”64  
 
The legislation that Bolling supported on campaign 
finance aligned directly with his preference for 
independent commissions and fuller representation 
by giving all a voice through smaller contributions. 
He became a supporter of the Clean Elections Act of 
1973 which proposed an independent bipartisan 
federal elections commission with the ability to 
investigate violations of law, annual contribution 
limits for individuals and organizations, matching 
federal grants for small contributions, and blocks of 
time on television for candidates.65   
 
                                                          
61 Ibid, 142-143. 
62 Ibid, 142-144. 
63 Rosenthal, Drawing the Line, 64 quoting the Hasting’s 
Center. Rosenthal explains that autonomy is enhanced when 
obligations such as money are reduced (Rosenthal, Drawing the 
Line, 182). 
64 Congressman Richard Bolling Letter Responding to 
Constituent, July 18, 1973, LaBudde Special Collections, 
Richard W. Bolling Collection, University of Missouri—
Kansas City, Box 110, folder 15. 
65 “Facts About the Udall*Anderson Clean Election Act of 
1973,” Attachment to a Letter from John B. Anderson, Morris 
K. Udall, et al., regarding legislation to effect campaign 
election reform, October 4, 1973, LaBudde Special Collections, 
Richard W. Bolling Collection, University of Missouri—
Kansas City, Box 110, folder 15. 
66 Factsheet on the Bolling Committee Report H.R. 988, 
Attachment to Letter from John W. Gardner to Richard 
Bolling, February 29, 1974, LaBudde Special Collections, 
Congressional Committee Reform 
 
Finally, Bolling is perhaps best known for his failed 
attempt to reform the House of Representatives 
committee system. Although indirectly related to 
ethics, Bolling’s writings on committee reform reveal 
his philosophy about the restrained use of power and 
his emphasis on national concerns rather than 
parochial interests.  
 
Bolling’s proposal to change the House committee 
structure, H.R. 988, included provisions for 
rearranging the jurisdiction of specific House 
committees such as the powerful Ways and Means 
Committee. The measure also sought to concentrate 
jurisdiction for a subject in one committee and limit 
each member of the House to one major committee. 
Finally, the measure established a system of 
congressional oversight over executive branch 
agencies to monitor the implementation of Congress’s 
programs.66 
 
Bolling was keenly aware of power and the use of 
power. He undertook the redesigning of the House 
Committee system because of the influence 
committees wield. Bolling acknowledged that “I am a 
very power-conscious person who feels that he should 
be humble in the exercise of that power.”67 Bolling 
referred to standing committees as “‘strategic points 
of influence.’”68 He recognized that committees 
control the substance of bills and the bills that get 
Richard W. Bolling Collection, University of Missouri—
Kansas City, Box 347, folder 2. Bolling’s push to restructure 
the committee system was not purely ideological; it was also 
practical and political. He sought to alter the power structure 
since conservative Democrats, the minority in the Democratic 
Party, controlled key committee positions (Bolling, House Out 
of Order, 237). In Bolling’s words, “Democrats put 
conservative foxes in charge of the liberal chicken coops” to 
the Republicans’ delight (Bolling, House Out of Order, 237).   
67 Diane Kiesel, “Dick Bolling: Kanas City’s Power in the 
House,” Kansas City Magazine, July 1981, 38, LaBudde 
Special Collections, Richard W. Bolling Collection, University 
of Missouri—Kansas City, Box 404, folder 31. 
68 Richard Bolling, “The Challenge of Congressional Reform,” 
Attachment to Letter from Gladys Uhl to Robert K. McDonald, 
Missouri Law Review, May 30, 1974, LaBudde Special 
Collections, Richard W. Bolling Collection, University of 
Missouri—Kansas City, Box 367, folder “UMKC Law Review 
Article ½.” 
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reported out.69  Bolling also argued that the committee 
structure influences the interests that are represented 
in the legislative process. Committee structure 
determines which citizens have input, a committee’s 
focus on narrow special interests or broader concerns, 
and whether Congress can address national problems 
comprehensively or in a fragmented manner.70 In 
other words, committee structure influences the 
nature of representation. It dictates both the inputs and 
the outcomes of the policy process. Bolling also 
viewed the power of the committee system as 
competing with the Speaker of the House’s power, 
and denying the speaker of the House the tools he 
needed for control.71 Instead of power resting with the 
speaker, it rested in a few committee chairs who were 
“anonymous” and unaccountable.72  
 
As illustrated, Bolling’s proposal for congressional 
committee reform highlights seemingly contradictory 
themes. He believes that power must be checked to 
create avenues for more voices to be heard, but 
legislators must have opportunity to exercise 
judgment in pursuit of the national interest and may 
not always listen to other voices. Similarly, legislators 
should exercise judgement, but should do so under the 
firm direction of the party leaders. Bolling attempts to 
mold and reconcile tensions in the political process 
with the twin purposes of being a politician pursuing 
political objectives and a statesman seeking to 
responsibly preserve the institution.73  
 
 
Bolling’s Brand of Legislative Ethics Reform 
 
Bolling’s approach to ethics reform is a complex 
blend of the trustee and delegate models of 
                                                          
69 Ibid.  
70 Richard Bolling, “The Challenge of Congressional Reform.”  
71 Richard Bolling, “Committees in the House,” Reprint from 
the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social 
Science 411 (January 1974): 1-14. LaBudde Special 
Collections, Richard W. Bolling Collection, University of 
Missouri—Kansas City, Box 350, folder “Committees in the 
House.” 
72 Bolling, House Out of Order, 39. Bolling’s observation about 
the dispersion of power in the House relates to ethics reform. 
As Jennings explains, within the Senate, the erosion of 
previous systems of control such as party discipline led to the 
need for ethics regulation. As traditional mechanisms of 
controlling Congressmen through the power of party discipline 
and an informal code of restraint, ethics regulation began to 
representation. His view of representation aligns with 
the trustee model in that he wants members of the 
House to use their own judgement74 and embrace a 
national view over parochial interests. Bolling, 
however, seems skeptical that this will happen 
voluntarily and his writings reflect a Madisonian 
realism that those in government are not angels, thus 
external and internal controls are required.75 
However, Bolling’s trustee leanings do not provide 
the groundwork for all of his thinking on ethics 
reform. At least one of Bolling’s remedies to the 
problems of ethics more closely aligns with the 
delegate model. The notion that actions such as 
accepting gifts from lobbyists should be subjected to 
public scrutiny because elected officials are 
accountable to their constituents is closer to the 
delegate approach.76   
 
Bolling’s legislative ethics also incorporate many of 
the standards discussed by Rosenthal.77 Bolling’s 
writings feature autonomy as a goal with publicity as 
his preferred tool. There is also an undercurrent of 
concern for the House as an institution, and an 
understanding by Bolling that he is a “custodian[s] of 
representative democracy.”78 
 
Bolling seeks to restrain the self-interested behavior 
of individual congressmen during a time of eroding 
party discipline, while still allowing them to exercise 
judgment in policy concerns. He seeks to check the 
power of moneyed interests in the electoral and 
legislative processes to give all voices a chance of 
being heard, while still acknowledging that the policy 
“whole” has to be greater than the sum of the 
individual “parts” in the political process for national 
goals to be realized for the welfare of the country.79 
become more institutionalized. (Jennings, “The 
Institutionalization of Ethics in the U.S. Senate,” 9). 
73 See Rosenthal’s discussion of responsibility as a standard 
(Rosenthal, Drawing the Line, 71-72). 
74 Bolling, House Out of Order, 46.   
75 Alexander Hamilton or James Madison, Federalist No. 51, 
February 8, 1788, accessed January 15, 2017, 
https://www.congress.gov/resources/display/content/The+Feder
alist+Papers.   
76 Thompson, The Ethics of Representations, 13-14. 
77 Rosenthal, Drawing the Line.   
78 Ibid, 71.  
79 As Thompson explains, “Implicit in the trustee-delegate 
dichotomy is an important issue that any code of legislative 
ethics ought to address, at least if the code is to go beyond 
proscribing conflicts of interest to promoting the just 
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Bolling searched for a means to promote a “just 
representation of interests”80 which combines respect 
for particular interests inherent in the delegate model 
with a desire for the broader view of the statesman’s 
independent judgment inherent in the trustee model.  
 
 
State of Missouri Legislature  
 
There are practical and theoretical challenges when 
comparing an individual congressman at the national 
level during one time period with an institution at the 
state level in another. For example, serving in the U.S. 
Congress is a full-time job, whereas state legislators 
may still be citizen-legislators in many places. In the 
area of ethics reform, however, there are common 
themes that cross units of analysis and boundaries of 
time. Conflict of interest, lobbying, and campaign 
finance continue to dominate questions of legislative 
and executive ethics due to the influence of money 
and the importance of power in the American system 
of government.  
 
Moreover, the standards of autonomy, publicity, 
appearance, fairness, and responsibility81 still apply to 
legislative ethics. Finally, Bolling was in Congress 
before, during, and after Watergate—a time when 
ethics reform resonated with the media and public. 
There was momentum for reform at the national level. 
Similarly, the current climate in Missouri is one in 
which ethics reform is salient to the public.  
 
The state of Missouri has, at times, had the distinction 
of being a state with some of the most lenient ethics 
requirements for legislators in the nation.82 As 
                                                          
representation of interests. In a properly functioning 
representative system, policies and decisions are not simply an 
aggregation of all the interests expressed in the political 
process” (Thompson, The Ethics of Representation, 12). 
80 Thompson, The Ethics of Representation, 12.  
81 Rosenthal, Drawing the Line, 64-72. 
82 “State Legislatures,” Stateline 42, No. 3 (March 2016): 12-
13, Professional Development Collection Database.  Dan 
Schnurbusch, “The Wild Mid-West: Missouri Ethics and 
Campaign Finance Under a Narrowed Corruption Regime,” 
Missouri Law Review 80, no. 4 (Fall 2015):1209, accessed 
January 15, 2017, 
http://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol80/iss4/19. 
83 Schnurbusch, “The Wild Mid-West: Missouri Ethics and 
Campaign Finance Under a Narrowed Corruption Regime,” 
1210.  
84 Ibid. See specifically note 14. 
explained by Dan Schnurbusch, at different points in 
history Missouri citizens and legislators have been 
committed to rooting out corruption and favoritism 
for special interests, but at other times the power 
structure has supported the status quo and even 
“roll[ed] back former efforts at reform.”83 Lax ethics 
requirements have earned Missouri the moniker of 
“The Wild Mid-West.”84 As Jason Hancock explains: 
“For years, Jefferson City’s reputation has been 
fueled in part by the fact that Missouri is the only state 
with no limits on both campaign contributions and 
lobbyist gifts. And as a result of that dynamic, six- 
and seven-figure donations to Missouri campaigns 
have become commonplace, and elected officials 
combine to accept hundreds of thousands of dollars in 
free meals, booze, trips and events tickets every 
year.”85  
 
The recent history of campaign finance illustrates the 
political struggle over ethics reform that has taken 
place in the state among citizens, the legislature, 
governor, and the courts. Missouri voters have long 
been in favor of caps on campaign contributions. Over 
twenty years ago, in 1994, Missourians 
“overwhelmingly” voted for limits on contributions.86 
The Missouri legislature later passed a law in 2006 to 
repeal the limits and the legislation was signed into 
law by the governor.87 The 2006 law was 
subsequently “struck down” by the Missouri Supreme 
Court due to procedural issues.88 Shortly after the 
court’s decision, the Missouri Legislature responded 
by again passing legislation repealing campaign 
contribution limits, which was signed into law by the 
85 Jason Hancock, “Could 2017 Be the Year that Ethics Reform 
Takes Hold in Missouri?” Kansas City Star, November 28, 
2016, accessed January 15, 2017, 
http://www.kansascity.com/news/politics-
government/article117558828.html. 
86 Jason Hancock, “Voter ID, Campaign Contribution Limits 
Among Issues on Missouri Ballot,” The Kansas City Star, 
September 23, 2016, accessed January 15, 1017, 
http://www.kansascity.com/news/politics-
government/article103817916.html. 
87 David Lieb, “Missouri Campaign Contribution Limits 
Repealed,” Columbia Missourian, July 22, 2008, accessed 
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governor in 2008.89 After eight years without 
campaign contribution limits in place, Missouri 
voters one more time cast their vote in favor of 
campaign contribution limits by passing Amendment 
2 in November 2016.90 As of December 2016, 
however, the challenges in the courts had begun with 
claims that the new limits place an unconstitutional 
burden on free speech and association.91  
 
There was skepticism regarding the effect of 
Amendment 2 well before the recent 2016 court 
challenges. Amendment 2 was passed against the 
national backdrop of the Supreme Court’s 2010 
Citizens United decision to eliminate the restrictions 
on independent expenditures by unions and 
corporations for advertisements to defeat candidates 
and the 2014 McCutcheon decision to eliminate the 
aggregate limits on the number of candidates and 
parties to which one individual can give.92 As 
reported by Jessica Karins, the reason that the passage 
of Amendment 2 in Missouri is “unlikely to transform 
politics is that political money in Missouri may 
simply take other routes . . . Thanks to the U.S. 
Supreme Court's Citizens United decision, those 
PACs can’t be stopped or silenced so long as they 
don’t coordinate directly with candidates. So by 
taking big money out of individual candidate coffers, 
Amendment 2 may simply be opening the floodgates 
to massive expenditures from special interest groups 
or donors.”93  
 
Although Amendment 2 may not have a 
transformative effect on Missouri politics, the 
                                                          
89 Ibid.  
90 Missouri Secretary of State, State of Missouri-2016 General 
Election-November 8, 2016, Official Results, accessed January 
15, 2017, http://enr.sos.mo.gov/.   
91 Jeff D. Gorman, “Businesses Challenge Missouri Donation 
Limits,” Courthouse News Service, December 28, 2016, 
accessed January 15, 2017, 
https://courthousenews.com/businesses-challenge-missouri-
campaign-donation-limits/. 
92 Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, accessed 
January 15, 2017, 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/09pdf/08-205.pdf; 
John Dunbar, “The ‘Citizens United’ Decision and Why It 
Matters,” The Center for Public Integrity, October 18, 2012, 
accessed January 15, 2017, 
https://www.publicintegrity.org/2012/10/18/11527/citizens-
united-decision-and-why-it-matters; McCutcheon et al. v. 
Federal Election Commission, accessed January 15, 2017, 
https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/13pdf/12-
passage of Amendment 2 by the citizens of Missouri 
signals a desire for reform on the part of the public. 
Additionally, some of the proposals “floated” for 
2017 in the state of Missouri included bans on 
lobbyist gifts, extending the six-month waiting period 
for lawmakers to become lobbyists, and enhancing 
the power of the Missouri Ethics Commission.94   
 
As with many issues in politics, leaders in Missouri 
government are in the process of balancing a variety 
of standards and values. Legislators must be able to 
make a living while serving in the state Legislature 
(fairness) and be able to finance their campaigns. 
However, they should also be free from undue 
influence of lobbyists (autonomy), consider the 
effects of appearance on the confidence of the public 
(appearance), and be mindful that they are stewards 
of democracy (responsibility).95 Ethics reform is 
further complicated by questions such as the role of 
interest groups in the American system of 
government, the interplay between particular interests 
and the public interest, and representation.  
 
Bolling’s thinking on ethics reform may inform the 
state of Missouri if legislators revisit the state’s 
approach to legislative ethics. Bolling’s writings span 
the continuum of ethics issues from practical 
considerations of political power and control to more 
theoretical considerations about the nature of 
representation itself and ethical standards. Thus 
Bolling’s thinking may help contemporary ethics 
reformers who desire legislative and electoral 
processes that are “open, accountable, and 
536_e1pf.pdf; Michael Beckel, “The ‘McCutcheon’ Decision 
Explained—More Money to Pour Into Political Process,” The 




Schnurbusch, “The Wild Mid-West: Missouri Ethics and 
Campaign Finance Under a Narrowed Corruption Regime.” 
93 Jessica Karins, “Campaign Finance Reform is Coming to 
Missouri—But Will It Change Anything?” River Front Times, 




94 Jason Hancock, “Could 2017 Be the Year that Ethics Reform 
Takes Hold in Missouri?”  
95 See the explanation of these standards by Rosenthal 
(Rosenthal, Drawing the Line, 64-72).  
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unbought.”96 His brand of political pragmatism and 
ethical standards from the 20th Century may be 
instructive for 21st Century legislative reformers.  
 
 
                                                          
96 John Gardner, Speech Before The Washington Press Club, 
October 17, 1974, 3, LaBudde Special Collections, Richard W. 
Bolling Collection, University of Missouri—Kansas City, Box 
347, folder 1. 
